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Abstract
This study investigates the market reaction to appointments and departures of independent directors to boards and various board committees,
as well as the magnitude of the market reaction based to the expertise and busyness of these directors. The findings suggest that investors in Turkish
capital markets do not value the existence of independent directors on boards or committees of boards. In addition, the findings suggest that
investors do not value the expertise of independent directors. However, investors appear to value the busyness of independent directors. The
findings are robust to various model specifications.
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1. Introduction
The trend in developed markets in the last decade has been
towards boards with a majority of independent directors. In
the US stock markets, the legal reforms and laws, such as
Sarbanes-Oxley Bill, and the regulations imposed by the stock
exchanges require the majority of board members to be
independent for public firms. In addition, these firms are
required to have their audit committees comprised of all
independent directors. Even though scholars still argue
whether or not these requirements are necessary (Black &
Kim, 2012; Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; Coles,
Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Karmel, 2014; Le Mire & Gilligan,
2013), boards in the US today are “more independent”
compared to the pre-Bill period (Linck, Netter, & Yang,
2008). On the other hand, director independence at public
firms in Turkey has mainly received attention in the most
recent years. As suggested by Ararat and Cetin (2008) and
Ararat, Black, and Yurtoglu (2014), prior to the corporate
governance reform of Turkey, a majority of firms did not have
any independent directors on their boards. However, as the
Principles of Corporate Governance (PCG) of Turkey became
effective, requirements such as those in developed countries
regarding director independence are imposed on Turkish
public companies.
Boards of directors generally consist of both inside and
independent directors. Inside directors, who are executives of
firms, have valuable firm specific knowledge and they can
deliver this information to outside board members. Still, these
insiders are relatively more influenced by CEOs and their
careers are more sensitively tied to CEOs, compared to
independent directors. Thus, these individuals might not be
able to evaluate and monitor CEOs effectively (Jensen,
1993).
This argument highlights the importance of independent
directors. The proponents of independent directors argue that
they could be considered as “more effective” monitors, com-
pared to insiders since their careers are not tied to CEOs. Thus,
they would be expected to be less influenced by CEOs, and
be better monitors. Also, for these independent directors,
☆ I would like to thank Ali Kutan (the Editor) and an anonymous referee for
very useful comments. In addition, I would like to thank Amy Marie Arioglu,
Pinar A. Kaya, Richard Lucas, Onder Uzkaralar, and Ann G. T. Young for their
valuable help.
E-mail address: earioglu@cu.edu.tr.
Peer review under responsibility of Borsa I˙stanbul Anonim S¸irketi.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2015.09.002
2214-8450/Copyright © 2015, Borsa I˙stanbul Anonim S¸irketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Borsa I˙stanbul Review 15-4 (2015) 259–271
http://www.elsevier.com/journals/borsa-istanbul-review/2214-8450
reputational concerns would be very important, in terms of
future opportunities to obtain additional board appointments in
other firms (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Masulis & Mobbs,
2014). Thus, independent directors could potentially be
expected to have the incentives to be better monitors (Wang &
Le, 2012). In addition, independent directors could be valuable
sources for advising (Huang, Hsu, Khan, & Yu, 2008), which,
alongside monitoring, is considered as one of the main respon-
sibilities of board members (Arioglu & Kaya, 2015; Coles,
Daniel, & Naveen, 2014). These directors could provide boards
with valuable connections to external resources.
On the other hand, the biggest potential disadvantage of
independent directors is that they could be expected to lack
valuable firm specific information, at least when their tenure is
not too long at the firm. However, this does not necessarily
imply that independent board members would be totally unin-
formed (Ravina & Sapienza, 2010).
In light of these arguments, researchers have widely inves-
tigated the effects of the existence of independent directors on
a variety of corporate issues. Gilson (1990) and Fich and
Shivdasani (2007) provide evidence supportive of reputational
concern arguments. Thus, one could expect independent direc-
tors to perform their monitoring functions effectively, leading to
improved firm performance and value. However, the majority of
empirical findings are not consistent with this expectation.
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Mehran (1995), and Wintoki,
Linck, and Netter (2012) find no relationship between the com-
position of the board and firm performace. Agrawal and
Knoeber’s (1996) evidence even suggests that more outsiders
present on the board of the firm are negatively related to firm
performance. However, Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis
(2013) provide evidence suggesting that board independence
has a positive impact on firm value.
Compared to the evidence provided in these studies, evi-
dence suggestive of positive effects of independent directors on
other corporate issues is more significant. Byrd and Hickman
(1992) provide supportive evidence in acquisition process.
Mehran (1995), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), and
Harvey and Shrieves (2001) provide evidence supportive of
positive effects in terms of compensation, whereas Weisbach
(1988) provides supportive evidence in CEO removal process.
Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma (2004) find evidence supportive of
positive effects on financial statement fraud likelihood.
However, in contradiction with these findings, Guthrie,
Sokolowsky, and Wan (2012) are not able to find a significant
effect of board composition on CEO pay.
In other studies, Bradley and Chen (2015) find that the
composition of boards has an effect on the risk taking by
board members. Brochet and Srinivasan (2014) show that
shareholders are likely to hold some independent directors
more accountable, compared to other directors, when firms
experience financial fraud. Armstrong, Core, and Guay (2014)
argue that there might be a simultaneous relationship between
board independence and transparency of the company.
Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) find a negative
relationship between board independence and price
informativeness for stocks. Also, there are studies that link the
existence of independent directors on boards with CEO power
(Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 2008).
Yet, the number of studies investigating director
independence for Turkish capital markets is very limited.
Ararat and Cetin (2008), Kaymak and Bektas (2008), and
Caliskan and Icke (2009) investigate director independence at
banks. Ararat, Aksu, and Cetin (2010) and Ararat, Orbay, and
Yurtoglu (2010) investigate the relationship between
independence and firm performance. Ararat et al. (2014)
investigate the issue in a governance index context. Different
from these studies, in this study I investigate the market
reaction to the appointments (departures) of independent
directors to (from) boards as well as their appointments to
(departures from) various board committees. In addition, I
investigate how the magnitude of the market reaction changes
based on the expertise and busyness of these directors, which
could potentially affect the monitoring capacities of
independent directors. To achieve this goal, I use a hand-
collected dataset that contains various characteristics of board
members. In addition, I utilize from a dataset, which contains
the announcements dates of director appointments and
departures, that I created by reading each announcement
submitted to the Public Disclosure Platform (PDP) by public
firms. To cope with any potential concerns regarding
econometric issues, I employ various (i) event window
lengths, (ii) expected return estimation models, and (iii)
market return variables, and conduct various significance tests
based on the arguments in Basdas and Oran (2014). I believe
that the findings of this study would provide valuable insights
for scholars investigating corporate governance in emerging
markets, as well as the policymakers in Turkish capital
markets.
2. Regulatory background
In this Section, I summarize the regulations that are related
to director independence in public firms quoted at the Borsa
Istanbul.1 In this study, the sample covers independent director
appointments and departures that were announced between
January 1, 2012 and June 30, 2014. Until January 3rd, 2014, the
Communique Serial IV No 56 of Capital Markets Board of
Turkey (CMB), which regulates the Principles of Corporate
Governance of Turkey, was effective. Before I proceed, it should
be noted that as opposed to some of theArticles of the PCG that
are in the form of suggestions, the Articles regarding indepen-
dent directors are mandatory for public firms.
The Article 4.3.3 of the PCG states that among the board
members, who are not employed in the company as
executives, there are independent board members. These
1 Legal regulations are vital for the practices of companies and could directly
or indirectly affect firm performance. Therefore, they could possibly affect
investor behavior. In addition, regulations that concern the practices of
companies would naturally have an effect on financial development and
economic growth of a country (Akisik, 2013; Law, Azman-Saini, & Tan, 2014;
Neyapti & Dincer, 2014).
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independent board members perform their duties without
being under any influence. The Article 4.3.4 states that the
number of independent board members could not be less than
one third of the total number of board members. When the
company calculates this number, the remainder in the
calculation would be considered as the following whole
number. In addition, the number of independent board
members would not be less than two, in any case. The Article
4.3.5 states that the term of office for these directors can be
up to three years and these directors can be nominated as
candidates for re-election.
While the Article 4.3.6 states that an individual, who has
been a board member for six year in the previous ten years,
could not be appointed to the board as an independent
member, the Article 4.3.7 states, in detail, the necessary
qualifications in order to be considered as an independent
director. According to this Article, the independent member of
the board should match the requirement that “any direct or
indirect employment capital or any important commercial
relationship between the company, one of the related party of
the company, the legal entities that are correlated with the
shareholders having 5% or more of company capitals directly
or indirectly in terms of administration and capital, and
himself, his spouse, his relatives related by blood or affinity
up to the third degree have not been established within five
years” (TKYD). The independent board member should also
match the following requirement, as well; “he has not worked
and not been assigned as a board member in other companies
who have conducted the whole or part of the company’s
activity and organization within the framework of the
agreements made with these companies, especially the
companies providing audit, grading and consultancy services
to the company, within the last five years” (TKYD).
In addition, the same Article requires the individual to have
not been a partner, employee or board member in any company,
which has provided significant service or products to the
company, in the last five years. Also, the individual, in the case
that she is a shareholder of the company as a result of her
position in the company’s board of directors, should not own
more than 1% of the shares, which should not be privileged
shares, of the company.
The same Article sets the requirement that the independent
director has information, education and experience, related to
her occupation that is sufficient to perform her duties as part of
her board assignment. The independent member should not be
employed full time in a public body or organization, once she is
proposed as a candidate to become a board member. Faculty
members are an exception to this requirement with the condi-
tion that she complies with the law and regulations that she is
subject to. The independent board member is required to be
deemed to reside in Turkey according to Turkish Income Tax
Law, as well. This Article also states that the independent board
member should have such ethical standards, occupational
respect and experience that she can be able to make decisions
freely in such a manner that she can contribute to the company
activities, while conserving her impartiality with the conflicts
of interests between company partners, and taking into account
the rights of stakeholders. Lastly, this Article highlights the
importance of the independent board member having sufficient
time to follow the company’s activities and perform director
duties, as well.
An individual, who satisfies these criteria can be nominated
as a candidate to become an independent member of the board.
The Article 4.3.8 outlines the details of the procedure of
nomination and election. A candidate to be nominated to be
elected as an independent director is assessed by the
Nomination Committee and the committee submits a report of
this assessment to the board of directors for approval. The
independent director candidate prepares and submits a
statement, which is written, to the Nomination Committee
stating that she satisfies the independence requirements
according to the laws, the articles of association of the firm and
the criteria stated in the PCG. Following the assessment report
of the Nomination Committee, the board of directors prepares
a candidate list and submits it to the CMB 60 days prior to the
general assembly of the firm. If the CMB submits a negative
opinion regarding the independence of director candidates on
the candidate list, the candidate is not submitted to the general
assembly of the firm as an independent director candidate. On
the other hand, the Article 4.3.9 defines the procedure for
instances which require the elimination of independence of the
board member. The Article states that an independent director,
who has lost her independence, resigns from the board after
informing the board about the change in her state of
independence and the change is announced to the public. In
this case, the Nomination Committee assesses the candidates
for the emptied seat and submits the assessment to the board of
directors by the first general assembly of the firm so that the
requirements regarding the minimum number of independent
directors on the board is re-ensured. Unless the CMB has a
negative opinion, the director that is appointed as an
independent director serves on the board of directors until the
first general assembly of the firm (TKYD).
In addition to these Articles, another point is important. The
Communique defines firms in three groups according to their
market values and the market values of active shares that are in
circulation. Based on these groups, some requirements such as
those regarding director independence are not applied to firms
in certain groups. Therefore, I also summarize the Articles of
the Communique that state the group definitions and the appli-
cation of certain Articles of the PCG that are related to director
independence.
The Article 5 of the Communique defines the firms in the
“First Group” as those whose average share values are over 3
billion TL and the average market value of shares in circulation
are over 750 million TL. On the other hand, the firms in the
“Second Group” are those whose average share values are over
1 billion TL and the average market value of shares in circula-
tion are over 250 million TL, excluding the firms in the First
Group. Lastly, the firms in the “Third Group” are defined as
those that are quoted at the BIST and are not quoted in the
Growing Business Market and theWatchlist Companies Market
of the BIST. The firms in the First Group and Second Group are
excluded from the Third Group (TKYD).
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For instance, theArticle 5 of the Communique states that the
sub-section 3 of the Article 4.3.8 and the sub-section 2 of the
Article 4.3.9 will not be applied to the public firms that are in
the Second Group and the Third Group. These sub-sections
concern the opinion about director independence by the CMB.
In addition, the Article 5 of the Communique also states that
criteria about the minimum number of independent directors as
stated in the Article 4.3.4 of the PCG does not apply to firms in
the Third Group in the case that the CMB find it suitable. In
such public firms, two independent directors will be sufficient
(TKYD). These Articles point out to the importance of director
independence in the three Groups. Therefore, in the following
sections, I perform tests on independent director appointments
and departures based which group the public firms in the
sample are in.
In addition, some other Articles in the Communique and the
PCG should be stated since they also concern director indepen-
dence. Sub-section (7) of theArticle 5 of the Communique state
that for the purpose of shareholder rights protection, in the
existence of reasonable circumstances, independent director
candidates that do not comply with one or more of the inde-
pendence criteria could be chosen at the general assembly as
independent directors if the CMB approves it. This appointment
would be temporary limited to a maximum of one year. In
addition, sub-section (8) of the Article 5 of the Communique
states that fulfilling at least half of the independent directors is
sufficient in order to comply with the independence criterion
regarding independent directors being deemed to reside in
Turkey according to Turkish Income Tax Law in the Article
4.3.7 of the PCG (TKYD).
Lastly, the Article 4.5.1 of the PCG states that all members
of audit committees are required to be independent directors,
whereas the chairmen of other committees in boards are
required to be independent directors. This Article points out to
the importance of director independence in providing addi-
tional oversight over the board by committees, members of
which would be expected to have professional expertise so that
they can perform their duties more effectively. Motivated by
this argument, I investigate the importance of the professional
expertise of independent directors in the following sections.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that on January 3rd,
2014, the new Corporate Governance Communique II-17.1
regarding the PCG was announced on the Official Gazette,
which revoked the Communique Serial IV No 56 of Capital
Markets Board of Turkey (CMB). However, the new
Communique did not change the criteria for classifying firms
into three groups based on market values. In addition, the new
Communique does not impose requirements regarding
director independence that is substantially different from the
previous one in a manner that it would affect the motivation
and findings of this study. An Article that is important for this
study is the Article 4.3.10 of the new PCG based on the new
Communique. This Article suggests that at least one of the
members of the audit committee has experience of five years
in the fields of auditing/accounting and finance. This is a
relevant topic I investigate in the following sections of the
study.
3. Data and methodology
In its most basic form, PCG defines board members, who are
not employed in the company as executives, as independent
directors. In order to investigate market reaction to independent
director changes, I analyzed announcements submitted to the
Public Disclosure Platform by firms quoted at the Borsa Istan-
bul (BIST) between January 1, 2012 and June 30, 2014. I only
included announcements submitted to the PDP since firms
quoted at the BIST are required to notify the PDP regarding
important corporate events. To identify all the news and events
to be included in my sample, I read each announcement sub-
mitted to the PDP by public firms during the sample period.
Due to the models I employ to estimate expected returns, I
excluded announcements submitted by any type of financial
firm, such as banks, factoring firms, insurance firms, and
REITs. This resulted in a sample of announcements submitted
to the PDP by 368 firms. However, it should be noted that some
of these firms did not submit any announcements regarding
independent directors.
Since event studies aim to investigate the unexpected impact
of certain events on security prices, I included only unexpected
announcements in my sample (Basdas & Oran, 2014). For
example, if director X’s term as a board member is known to
end on a certain date and she leaves the board on that date, the
announcement of her departure was not included in the sample.
However, if director Y resigns from the board unexpectedly,
then her departure was included in the sample. In addition, only
isolated events were included in the sample. For example, if
director Z will leave the board at a future date and the firm
announces her departure at an annual meeting, this announce-
ment was not included in the sample since numerous other
announcements regarding corporate issues are made at the
annual meeting as well. In this case, it would not be possible to
separately measure the effect of each announcement on stock
prices. Also, to prevent potential effects of survivorship bias, I
included announcements made by firms that are delisted in
subsequent periods. My final sample included announcements
regarding 233 independent director appointments, 92 indepen-
dent director departures. In addition, to provide insight to the
readers regarding how investors react to the appointments and
departures of directors that are not independent, I also analyzed
the market reaction to 189 inside director appointments and 238
inside director departures.
Other data employed through the analyses in the paper
were gathered from various official data sources. Monthly
return data required for creating momentum portfolios
employed in 4 factor model (4FM) and daily stock returns
were gathered from Finnet, which is a data provider for firms
quoted at the BIST. Data regarding stock market indices,
market values, and book-to-market values for firms were
obtained from the Borsa Istanbul. Financial statements were
gathered from I˙s¸ Yatırım, which is also a data provider for
firms quoted at the BIST. Lastly, data about director and firm
characteristics were collected manually from the annual
reports and official webpages of firms. Following the concerns
discussed in Basdas and Oran (2014), returns calculated by
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employing adjusted price series, rather than raw price series,
were employed in the calculation of daily and monthly
returns. These series consider events such as stock splits,
dividend payments and increases in capital (Berument,
Ceylan, & Onar, 2013; Canbas & Kandir, 2009).
A majority of the previous studies investigating abnormal
returns around various events for Turkish capital markets
employ the following models to estimate unexpected returns:
(i) returns on index (Mandaci, 2003), (ii) the simple market
model (Aygoren & Uyar, 2007; Binici & Koksal, 2013; Demir
& Danis, 2011), (iii) market adjusted returns (Uludag &
Gulbudak, 2010; Yilmaz & Gulay, 2006), (iv) the capital asset
pricing model (Batchelor & Orgakcioglu, 2003), and (v) the
mean adjusted volatility (Onder & Simga-Mugan, 2006).
However, Ahern (2009) argues that these models could
potentially generate biased results. On the other hand,
Tahaoglu and Guner (2011) employ the 3 factor model (3FM).
In this study, I applied both the 3FM and the 4FM to estimate
expected returns for stocks, which is a common practice in
studies investigating reactions to corporate events in
developed markets. Numerous studies regarding developed
markets argue that these models outperform standard capital
asset pricing models in explaining the variation in stock
returns (Fama & French, 1993, 2012) and that they generate
less skewed abnormal returns (Ahern, 2009). For Turkish
capital markets, Unlu (2012) provide evidence that these
models capture the variation in stock returns of firms quoted
at Borsa Istanbul. Readers interested in the details of these
models can consult Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997),
and Fama and French (2012).
Via these models, I estimated the coefficients based on
various estimation windows for each firm’s stock i. Then, I
utilized these coefficients to calculate the expected returns for
stock i. The difference between the realized return and the
expected return is the abnormal return. I repeated this proce-
dure for each firm in the sample. As is customary (MacKinley,
1997), I calculated cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over
various event windows. Then I calculated CAARs as cumula-
tive abnormal average returns.
Based on earlier studies (Ahern, 2009; Falato,
Kadyrzhanova, & Lel, 2014; Giroud & Mueller, 2010;
Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007), I employed 240 previous
trading days as the estimation window. As is standard in the
literature, the estimation window did not include the days
immediately prior to the event (Ahern, 2009). In addition, I
employed (−10,+10), (−5,+5), (−1,+1) and (0) as alternative
event windows consistent with the methodologies of previous
studies (Dittmar & Field, 2015; Hsu, Reed, & Rocholl, 2010;
Kruger, 2015).
The significance of these CARs is investigated using various
tests commonly employed in the literature, which consider the
distribution of CARs. I employed the following parametric tests
based on previous literature: (i) BMP test, and (ii) cross-
sectional t-test. In addition, I use a sign test as an alternative
non-parametric test. A non-parametric could be econometri-
cally considered as better specified and more powerful com-
pared to parametric tests due to the underlying normality
assumptions of parametric tests. I employed both parametric
and non-parametric tests for robustness, as it is standard in
finance literature.
4. Results
4.1. Board appointments and departures
In this section, I present findings regarding the
appointments and departures of independent directors, as
well as the appointments and departures of inside directors.
Based on more effective monitoring arguments, one could
expect the markets to respond positively (negatively) to the
appointments (departures) of independent directors to (from)
boards.
There are various studies investigating the market reaction
to independent director changes. Rosenstein and Wyatt
(1990), Mak, Sequeira, and Yeo (2003) and Masulis, Ruzzier,
Xiao, and Zhao (2012) find significant positive market
reaction around independent director appointments. However,
Lin, Pope, and Young (2003) and Gunasekarage and Reed
(2008) find no significant market reaction to the appointment
of independent directors to boards. On the other hand, Nguyen
and Nielsen (2010) find significantly negative returns
following the unexpected deaths of independent directors.
Bhagat and Bolton (2013) find evidence of positive market
reaction when companies comply with legal director
independence requirements as a result of adding independent
directors to boards.
The findings of this study are presented in Table 1. What is
observed is that the markets react positively to the
appointment of independent directors to boards on the event
days and the most immediate days surrounding them.
However, the CAARs are not statistically significant at 95%
level. What is also observed in the Table is that the markets
react negatively to the departures of independent directors
from boards. However the negative reaction is not significant
when one considers the CAARs on the event day and the most
immediate days surrounding it. When CAARs (−5,+5) and
(−10,+10) are considered, the negative CAARs are statistically
significant. In the case of inside director departures from
boards, negative CAARs are observed for 3 day and 10 day
event windows surrounding the departures, whereas positive
CAARs are observed on the event day and the 20 day event
window around the event. Yet, none of these CAARs are
statistically significant.
Overall, based on the evidence regarding the most
immediate market reaction surrounding independent director
changes in Table 1, one cannot suggest that investors in
Turkish capital markets value the existence of independent
directors on boards.
4.2. Committee appointments and departures
Even though the board of directors exists in order to ensure
that the interests of minority shareholders are protected, one
could argue that some members of the board could avoid their
responsibilities. Committees of boards are one of the potential
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mechanisms to prevent such problems. It is possible that the
characteristics of these directors such as their independence
could have an impact on the effectiveness of their monitoring
(Dionne, Chun, & Triki, 2013). Based on the argument that
independence directors could provide more effective
monitoring, one could expect the markets to react positively
(negatively) to the appointments (departures) of independent
directors to (from) board committees. Thus, the next set
of findings concern the appointments of (departures)
independent directors to (from) the governance and the risk
committees of the boards. It should be noted that I do not
investigate the market reaction concerning the changes of
independent auditing committee members since every
member of these committees must be independent according
to legal regulations.
The findings are presented in Table 2. What is observed in
the Table is that the CAARs surrounding the appointment of
independent directors to risk committees are negative, except
Table 1
Market reaction to director changes: Independents versus insiders.
CAAR (0) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Independent Director Appointment 0.287% 233 1.83 1.84 0.85
Independent Director Departure −0.208% 92 −0.63 −0.94 0.00
Inside Director Appointment 0.280% 189 1.25 0.56 0.65
Inside Director Departure 0.277% 238 1.76 1.15 −0.25
CAAR (−1,+1) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Independent Director Appointment 0.300% 233 1.46 0.51 1.50
Independent Director Departure −0.276% 92 −0.68 −0.95 −0.62
Inside Director Appointment −0.073% 189 −0.28 −1.39 −0.65
Inside Director Departure −0.046% 238 −0.21 −1.46 −0.51
CAAR (−5,+5) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Independent Director Appointment −0.081% 233 −0.11 −0.82 −1.24
Independent Director Departure −3.807% 92 −2.48 −2.33 −1.65
Inside Director Appointment 0.399% 189 0.50 −0.24 1.09
Inside Director Departure −0.144% 238 −0.22 −1.38 −0.90
CAAR (−10,+10) Number of events Cross-Sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Independent Director Appointment 0.036% 233 0.04 −0.58 −1.71
Independent Director Departure −4.595% 92 −2.68 −2.42 −2.29
Inside Director Appointment 0.565% 189 0.61 −0.15 −1.52
Inside Director Departure 0.300% 238 0.39 −0.55 −2.00
4 Factor Model is employed to estimate expected returns for stocks. The return for the XTUM (the index that includes all the stocks traded at the BIST) is employed
as the market return. The sample includes all the firms traded at the BIST.
Table 2
Committee appointments and departures of independent directors.
CAAR (0) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Risk Comm. Appointment −0.006% 162 −0.02 1.00 −0.15
Risk Comm. Departure −0.302% 17 −0.47 0.13 1.69
Governance Comm. Appointment 0.272% 101 1.13 1.31 −0.09
Governance Comm. Departure −1.469% 24 −2.28 −2.13 −0.81
CAAR (−1,+1) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Risk Comm. Appointment −0.063% 162 −0.17 0.80 0.00
Risk Comm. Departure 0.910% 17 1.48 2.11 1.69
Governance Comm. Appointment 0.228% 101 0.72 0.67 0.89
Governance Comm. Departure −1.524% 24 −1.74 −1.28 −0.81
CAAR (−5,+5) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Risk Comm. Appointment 0.202% 162 0.26 0.98 0.31
Risk Comm. Departure −0.783% 17 −0.42 −0.28 0.24
Governance Comm. Appointment −0.520% 101 −0.60 −0.69 −1.09
Governance Comm. Departure −3.424% 24 −1.30 −1.23 −0.40
CAAR (−10,+10) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Risk Comm. Appointment −1.188% 162 −1.00 −0.60 −1.72
Risk Comm. Departure −2.446% 17 −0.71 −0.58 −0.72
Governance Comm. Appointment −0.200% 101 −0.18 0.01 −0.29
Governance Comm. Departure −5.236% 24 −1.53 −1.41 −1.22
4 Factor Model is employed to estimate expected returns for stocks. The return for the XTUM (the index that includes all the stocks traded at the BIST) is employed
as the market return. The sample includes all the firms traded at the BIST.
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the CAAR in the event window of ten days around the appoint-
ments. Yet, none of these CAARs are significantly distinguish-
able from zero. In terms of departures of independent directors
from risk committees, the CAARs surrounding these departures
are negative, except the CAAR in the event window of three
days surrounding the appointments. However, once again these
CAARs are not statistically significant.
The Table also presents CAARs surrounding the appoint-
ments (departures) of independent directors to (from) gover-
nance committees. The CAARs on the appointment days and
the most immediate three days surrounding them are positive,
whereas they are positive for longer event windows. However,
none of these CAARs are significantly different than zero. On
the other hand, substantial negative CAARs are observed
around the departures of independent directors from gover-
nance committees. On the event day, the CAAR is −1.46% and
statistically significant. Higher negative CAARs are observed
as the event window extends. However, they are not statistically
significant.
Based on the overall evidence presented in Table 2, one
could suggest that even though the markets react negatively to
the departures of independent directors from governance com-
mittees, investors do not seem to value the appointments
(departures) of independence directors to (from) the commit-
tees of boards. In addition, in untabulated results, it is also
observed that the market does not react significantly to the
appointments and departures of directors to committees of
boards, regardless of their independence.
4.3. Director expertise
The expertise of directors is a phenomenon extensively
investigated in the literature. Researches argue that expert
directors such as financial and accounting experts, lawyers and
academicians could provide boards various benefits (Anderson,
Reeb, Upadhyay, & Zhao, 2011; Defond, Hann, & Hu, 2005;
Francis, Hasan, & Wu, 2014; Guner, Malmendier, & Tate,
2008), even though their existence in the boardroom could also
bring some costs (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Jiang & Murphy,
2007). In a recent study, Masulis et al. (2012) provide evidence
of significant positive returns around the appointments of inde-
pendent expert directors. Motivated by their finding and the
arguments in the studies mentioned and the fact that a nontrivial
number of independent directors appointed to boards by firms
are financial experts, lawyers and academicians, in this subsec-
tion, I investigate whether the market reacts differently to inde-
pendent director appointments and departures based on their
expertise. If the markets value the expertise of independent
directors, one could expect the markets to react positively
(negatively) to the appointments (departures) of expert inde-
pendent directors to (from) boards.
I define a financial expert as a director who was/is on the
board, or has been or currently is the CEO of a financial
institution. I define a director that is certified as a CPA or
equivalent as an accounting expert. Due to the low number of
observations, I define a director as an expert director if she is
a financial expert, or an accounting expert, or a lawyer or a
professor.
The findings are presented in Table 3. The Table shows that
the market reacts positively to the appointments of expert inde-
pendent directors to boards. Yet, the market reaction is statisti-
cally significant only on the event day. However, the market
reacts positively to the departure of expert independent direc-
tors on the event day and the three days surrounding the depar-
tures as well. On the other hand, the CAARs for the ten days and
20 days surrounding the departure of expert independent
Table 3
Expertise of independent directors.
CAAR (0) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Expert Director Appointment 0.417% 123 2.06 1.99 1.97
Expert Director Departure 0.183% 47 0.36 −0.11 0.72
Non-Expert Director Appointment 0.247% 94 0.98 1.14 −0.82
Non-Expert Director Departure −0.916% 32 −1.82 −1.75 −0.70
CAAR (−1,+1) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Expert Director Appointment 0.504% 123 1.65 1.21 2.61
Expert Director Departure 0.630% 47 1.05 0.68 1.60
Non-Expert Director Appointment 0.280% 94 0.95 0.01 0.00
Non-Expert Director Departure −1.655% 32 −2.50 −2.32 −2.82
CAAR (−5,+5) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Expert Director Appointment 0.861% 123 0.82 0.24 −0.09
Expert Director Departure −4.039% 47 −1.52 −1.33 −0.43
Non-Expert Director Appointment −1.284% 94 −1.33 −1.78 −1.85
Non-Expert Director Departure −3.995% 32 −1.94 −1.90 −1.06
CAAR (−10,+10) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Expert Director Appointment 0.397% 123 0.33 −0.12 −1.35
Expert Director Departure −4.480% 47 −1.66 −1.45 −0.79
Non-Expert Director Appointment −0.765% 94 −0.58 −1.07 −1.44
Non-Expert Director Departure −3.689% 32 −1.47 −1.37 −1.76
4 Factor Model is employed to estimate expected returns for stocks. The return for the XTUM (the index that includes all the stocks traded at the BIST) is employed
as the market return. The sample includes all the firms traded at the BIST.
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directors are around −4% even though they are not statistically
significant.
In terms of the appointments of non-expert independent
directors to boards, the market reaction is positive on the event
day and the three days surrounding it, whereas it is negative in
the ten and twenty days surrounding the appointments. Still,
none of these CAARs are statistically significant. Surprisingly,
the markets react negatively to the departures of non-expert
independent directors from boards and the CAARs are signifi-
cant at 90% level on the event day and the ten days surrounding
the departures, and at 95% for the three days surrounding the
departures.
Overall, based on the evidence in the Table, one could argue
that the markets do not value the expertise of independent
directors highly.
4.4. Director busyness
As mentioned earlier, independent directors could be
expected to be more effective monitors than inside directors.
However, it could be argued that these directors might not
necessarily be more effective, especially if they hold
directorships in other firms’ boards of directors. They might
not be able to put enough effort and time into their monitoring
duties as a result of being busy (Ferris, Jagannathan, &
Pritchard, 2003; Field, Lowry, & Mkrtchyan, 2013). Still,
since they would be expected to gain additional skills and
expertise through additional directorships, they could
potentially provide boards and CEOs with improved advising
(Coles et al., 2014; Faleye, Hoitash, & Hoitash, 2013; Kim,
Mauldin, & Patro, 2014).
Ferris et al. (2003), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), and Masulis
andMobbs (2011) provide evidence suggesting that the markets
do not favor directors becoming busy. In addition, Mak et al.
(2003) provide evidence of positive market reaction to the
appointments of independent directors to boards for Singapor-
ean firms. They show that among independent directors, direc-
tors with multiple board memberships are especially favored by
the markets. Motivated by these findings and the arguments just
mentioned, I investigate whether the market reaction to inde-
pendent director changes differs for busy directors compared to
non-busy directors.
Thus, in this section, I present findings regarding whether or
not investors value the busyness of independent directors. If the
market values the additional advisory skills of these directors
higher than any potential costs of decreased monitoring capa-
bilities, one could expect to observe positive (negative) market
reaction to the appointments (departures) of busy independent
directors to (from) boards. A director is considered busy if she
is on the boards of at least three companies that are not
non-profits.
The results are presented in Table 4. The findings in theTable
suggest that the markets react positively to the appointments of
busy independent directors to boards. However, only the CAAR
for the three days surrounding the appointments is statistically
significant.
On the other hand, the market reacts negatively to the depar-
ture of busy independent directors. The CAARs are significant
on the event day and for the 20 days surrounding the departures
at 95% level, whereas the CAARs for the three days and ten
days surrounding the departures are significant at 90% level.
In terms of non-busy independent director changes in
boards, the Table shows that investors react positive to the
appointments of non-busy independent directors on the event
days and the three days surrounding them. However, the
CAARs are not statistically significant at 95% level. As the
Table 4
Busyness of independent directors.
CAAR (0) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Busy Director Appointment 0.286% 70 1.20 1.70 1.91
Busy Director Departure −1.131% 34 −2.96 −2.52 −2.40
Non-Busy Director Appointment 0.354% 129 1.69 1.51 0.26
Non-Busy Director Departure 0.344% 50 0.65 0.15 1.41
CAAR (−1,+1) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Busy Director Appointment 1.162% 70 3.06 2.40 1.91
Busy Director Departure −0.993% 34 −1.74 −1.46 −0.68
Non-Busy Director Appointment 0.152% 129 0.55 0.02 2.02
Non-Busy Director Departure 0.154% 50 0.25 −0.27 −0.28
CAAR (−5,+5) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Busy Director Appointment 1.476% 70 1.26 0.68 −0.23
Busy Director Departure −5.662% 34 −1.74 −1.57 −0.68
Non-Busy Director Appointment −0.661% 129 −0.65 −0.87 −0.26
Non-Busy Director Departure −3.464% 50 −1.99 −2.12 −1.41
CAAR (−10,+10) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Busy Director Appointment 0.665% 70 0.51 −0.05 −2.39
Busy Director Departure −7.470% 34 −2.49 −2.01 −1.71
Non-Busy Director Appointment −0.292% 129 −0.23 −0.46 −0.26
Non-Busy Director Departure −3.660% 50 −1.56 −1.60 −1.69
4 Factor Model is employed to estimate expected returns for stocks. The return for the XTUM (the index that includes all the stocks traded at the BIST) is employed
as the market return. The sample includes all the firms traded at the BIST.
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event window extends, the signs of the CAARs become nega-
tive. Still, they are not statistically significant either. Similar
patterns are observed for non-busy independent director
departures.
Based on these findings, one could argue that the markets
value whether the independent directors that are appointed to
(depart from) boards are busy or not. It appears that the inves-
tors value the benefits of buys directors in the form of increased
advising capabilities higher than the potential costs of
decreased monitoring capabilities.
5. Additional tests
5.1. Differences across firm groups based on Communiques
Both the old Communique and the new Communique
group public firms into 3 groups based on the same criteria as
mentioned in the previous sections. Based on these groupings,
firms in the third group are exempt from various regulations
stated in some of the Articles of the PCG. For example, a
relevant Article of the Communique states that for firms in the
third group, two independent directors would be enough and
the criteria stated in the relevant Article of the PCG regarding
the minimum number of independent directors on boards is
revoked for these firms. Therefore, it would be interesting to
investigate whether the market reaction changes based on
which group the firm is in. Thus, in this sub-section, I
investigate the market reaction to director changes in each
group separately. The findings are presented in Table 5.
Table 5 shows that sign and magnitude of CAARs change
based on firm groupings. When the CAARs on the announce-
ment days of independent director appointments are considered,
it is observed that the CAAR for the first group is 0.668%,
which is statistically significant. For the firms in the second and
third groups, the CAARs are 0.077% and 0.265%, respectively.
However, these CAARs are not statistically significant. On the
other hand, the CAARs in the three days surrounding the
announcements of independent director appointments are
0.032%, −0.796% and 0.614% for the first, second and third
Table 5
Market reaction to director changes based on Communique groupings.
Panel A: Group 1 Firms – Market Value of Shares over 750.00 Million TL
CAAR (0) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Independent Director Appointment 0.668% 31 2.69 2.46 0.89
Independent Director Departure 0.445% 17 0.85 0.93 1.21
Inside Director Appointment −0.335% 66 −1.74 −1.61 −0.73
Inside Director Departure −0.106% 85 −0.57 −0.79 −1.19
CAAR (−1,+1) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Independent Director Appointment 0.032% 31 0.11 0.01 0.53
Independent Director Departure −0.113% 17 −0.22 −0.18 −0.24
Inside Director Appointment −0.487% 66 −1.45 −1.50 −1.47
Inside Director Departure −0.425% 85 −1.58 −1.66 −1.41
Panel B: Group 2 Firms – Market Value of Shares between 250.00 Million TL and 749.99 Million TL
CAAR (0) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Independent Director Appointment 0.077% 39 0.22 0.40 0.80
Independent Director Departure −0.499% 11 −0.48 −0.29 −0.90
Inside Director Appointment 0.904% 34 2.62 2.59 2.05
Inside Director Departure 0.703% 36 2.64 2.65 2.33
CAAR (−1,+1) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Independent Director Appointment −0.796% 39 −1.57 −1.57 −0.80
Independent Director Departure −0.919% 11 −1.07 −0.90 −0.30
Inside Director Appointment −0.121% 34 −0.31 −0.68 1.02
Inside Director Departure −0.233% 36 −0.69 −1.33 0.33
Panel C: Group 3 Firms – Market Value of Shares under 249.99 Million TL
CAAR (0) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Independent Director Appointment 0.265% 163 1.39 1.17 0.23
Independent Director Departure −0.332% 64 −0.79 −1.43 −0.25
Inside Director Appointment 0.499% 89 1.15 0.72 0.31
Inside Director Departure 0.425% 117 1.54 1.25 −0.64
CAAR (−1,+1) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Independent Director Appointment 0.614% 163 2.37 1.47 1.95
Independent Director Departure −0.209% 64 −0.38 −0.68 −0.50
Inside Director Appointment 0.250% 89 0.54 −0.24 −0.31
Inside Director Departure 0.288% 117 0.80 0.02 0.27
4 Factor Model is employed to estimate expected returns for stocks. The return for the XTUM (the index that includes all the stocks traded at the BIST) is employed
as the market return. The sample includes all the firms traded at the BIST.
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group, respectively. Among these, only the CAAR for the third
group is statistically significant.
Table 5 also shows the CAARs surrounding the announce-
ments of independent director departures for the three groups
separately. The CAARs on the days of these announcements are
0.445%, −0.499% and −0.332% for the first, second and third
group, respectively. None of these CAARs are statistically sig-
nificant. The CAARs for the three days surrounding these
announcements are −0.113%, −0.919% and −0.209% for the
first, second and third group, respectively. Once again, none of
the CAARs are statistically significant.
The CAARs on the days of the announcements and the three
days surrounding the announcements do not present a pattern
that would suggest that market reaction to independent director
appointments and departures changes monotonically based on
market value of firms. However, it would be possible that the
market reaction to director changes among independent and
inside directors could change with various firm characteristics
such as market value. That is what is investigated next.
5.2. Independent directors versus inside directors
In section 4, I present CAARs surrounding appointments
and departures of directors that are independent and that are
insiders. However, I do not compare the CAARs in-between
these groups. For instance, one could argue that an approach
that compares the CAARs between independent director
appointments (departures) and inside director appointments
(departures) for different firms could not constitute a realistic
counterfactual. To cope with such a concern, I intend to utilize
propensity score matching methods. Via these methods, one
could reduce potential biases in non-randomized experiments
by creating populations that are systematically similar as a
result of matching samples and control groups based on various
covariates (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007; Rosenbaum &
Rubin, 1985).
The first step of such an analysis is to test whether there
exists a relationship between director independence and the
estimated CARs. In other words, one needs to test whether
director independence affects CARs surrounding director
appointments and departures. Only then, one can proceed with
estimating propensity scores to analyze whether investors react
differently to the appointments (departures) of independent and
inside directors differently based on various firm characteris-
tics. Unfortunately, this is not the case as can be observed in
Table 6.
Table 6 presents the results of the tests that investigate a
potential relationship between director independence and
CARs on the event days for two sub-samples: (i) a sub-sample
that includes the appointments of both inside and independent
directors, and (ii) a sub-sample that includes the departures of
both inside and independent directors. Based on these figures,
one cannot argue that director independence is associated with
the CARs surrounding director appointments and departures.
Therefore, I do not proceed with propensity score matching
based comparison for the CAARs surrounding the appoint-
ments and departures of independent and inside directors.
6. Conclusions
In this study I investigate the market reaction to the
appointments (departures) of independent directors to (from)
boards as well as their appointments to (departures from)
various board committees. Motivated by the findings of
previous studies, I also investigate how the magnitude of the
market reaction changes based on the expertise and busyness
of these directors.
I am unable to provide evidence to suggest that investors in
Turkish capital markets value the existence of independent
directors on boards of public firms. The market reactions sur-
rounding independent director appointments are positive, yet
they are not statistically significant at 95% level. On the other
hand, market reactions to independent director departures are
negative. However, the reactions are not statistically significant
on the days of departures and the three days surrounding the
departures. Similarly, I am unable to provide evidence to
suggest that investors value the existence of independent direc-
tors on the committees of boards, even though the market reac-
tion on the days of independent director departures from
governance committees are statistically significant. In addition,
investors do not appear to value whether the independent direc-
tors are experts in specific areas or not. It is only the market
reaction on the day of independent expert director appointments
that is statistically significant. Lastly, the evidence suggests that
the markets value whether the independent directors that are
appointed to (depart from) boards are busy or not, especially on
the most immediate days surrounding the appointments and
departures of independent directors that are also busy. In addi-
tion, additional analysis provides evidence suggesting that
market reaction to independent director appointments and
departures does not change monotonically based on market
value of firms. Overall, I am unable to provide evidence sug-
gesting that investors in Turkish capital markets value director
independence. The findings are robust to various model speci-
fications as can be observed in the Appendix.
As Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) argue emerging markets
could be characterized as having weaker corporate governance
mechanisms, compared to developed markets. The main agency
problems in emerging markets exist between minority share-
holders and controlling shareholder, rather than between man-
agers and outside shareholders, as it is the case of developed
markets (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). The mechanisms that
are being imposed by regulators and policymakers in order to
protect the benefits of minority shareholders might not be as
effective as they are in developed countries if the institutional
Table 6
Test of a potential relationship between director independence and CARs.
Estimate Standard error t value Pr > |t|
Director appointments
Intercept 0.002807 0.001936 1.45 0.14
Independent 0.000068 0.002605 0.03 0.97
Director departures
Intercept 0.002775 0.001715 1.62 0.11
Independent −0.004864 0.003249 −1.50 0.13
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structure is not fully developed and small shareholders do not
believe that their rights are protected to the full extent by legal
authorities. If investors believe that firms appoint independent
directors just to comply with regulations, rather than to ensure
that small shareholders’ best interests are considered, they
might not value the existence of independence directors on
boards or committees of boards. Thus, the reaction of investors
to director independence in developed markets might not be
observed in emerging markets.
Policymakers should be aware of the fact that corporate
governance mechanisms and applications in a country could
have direct or indirect effects on the economic growth, employ-
ment and poverty of the country, as well as improved perfor-
mance and efficiency at the firm level, and more developed
financial markets (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). Thus, a sound
corporate governance environment in a country could be
considered an important factor in a country’s ability to attract
more cross-border investments and portfolio investments
(Bhagat, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2011; Rossi & Volpin, 2004).
If the authorities that are in charge of Turkish economy aim
the Turkish capital markets to be able to compete against not
only other emerging markets, but also developed countries for
economic resources that are scarce in their nature, they should
focus on the differences between the behaviors of investors in
capital markets of developed countries and Turkish capital
markets. Therefore, I believe that the evidence I provide in this
study could be a valuable resource for policymakers and regu-
lators in Turkish capital markets in understanding how the
behavior of participants of financial markets in Turkey differ
from those in developed economies.
Appendix.
Table 7
Robustness Tests – 3 Factor Model with XTUM as Market Return.
CAAR (−1,+1) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Independent Director Appointment 0.342% 233 1.65 0.68 1.37
Independent Director Departure −0.349% 92 −0.83 −1.13 −1.25
Insider Director Appointment −0.083% 189 −0.32 −1.41 −0.50
Insider Director Departure −0.075% 238 −0.36 −1.58 0.12
Risk Comm. Appointment −0.140% 162 −0.38 0.56 −0.15
Risk Comm. Departure 0.761% 17 1.27 1.89 1.21
Governance Comm. Appointment 0.124% 101 0.38 0.45 0.29
Governance Comm. Departure −1.699% 24 −1.88 −1.45 −0.81
Expert Director Appointment 0.566% 123 1.88 1.37 2.43
Expert Director Departure 0.521% 47 0.81 0.47 0.72
Non-Expert Director Appointment 0.266% 94 0.87 0.01 0.00
Non-Expert Director Departure −1.762% 32 −2.61 −2.50 −2.82
Busy Director Appointment 1.196% 70 3.15 2.48 1.91
Busy Director Departure −1.212% 34 −1.91 −1.65 −1.02
Non-Busy Director Appointment 0.219% 129 0.78 0.19 1.84
Non-Busy Director Departure 0.061% 50 0.09 −0.43 −0.84
3 Factor Model is employed to estimate expected returns for stocks. The return for the XTUM (the index that includes all the stocks traded at the BIST) is employed
as the market return. The sample includes all the firms traded at the BIST.
Table 8
Robustness tests – 4 factor model with X100 as market return.
CAAR (−1,+1) Number of events Cross-sect. t-test BMP t-test Sign Test
Independent Director Appointment 0.299% 233 1.45 0.50 0.98
Independent Director Departure −0.281% 92 −0.69 −0.95 −0.62
Insider Director Appointment −0.064% 189 −0.25 −1.34 −0.80
Insider Director Departure −0.036% 238 −0.17 −1.42 −0.64
Risk Comm. Appointment −0.050% 162 −0.14 0.85 0.00
Risk Comm. Departure 0.884% 17 1.43 2.06 1.69
Governance Comm. Appointment 0.234% 101 0.73 0.69 0.89
Governance Comm. Departure −1.538% 24 −1.74 −1.27 −0.81
Expert Director Appointment 0.504% 123 1.65 1.21 2.25
Expert Director Departure 0.616% 47 1.03 0.67 1.60
Non-Expert Director Appointment 0.277% 94 0.94 −0.01 −0.20
Non-Expert Director Departure −1.656% 32 −2.49 −2.31 −2.82
Busy Director Appointment 1.165% 70 3.06 2.39 1.91
Busy Director Departure −0.997% 34 −1.76 −1.48 −0.68
Non-Busy Director Appointment 0.150% 129 0.54 0.02 1.49
Non-Busy Director Departure 0.148% 50 0.24 −0.28 −0.28
4 Factor Model is employed to estimate expected returns for stocks. The return for the X100 (the index that includes all the stocks traded at the BIST) is employed
as the market return. The sample includes all the firms traded at the BIST.
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